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Abstract
Trust in multiagent systems is used for seeking to minimize
the uncertainty in the interactions among the agents. In this
paper, we discuss how to use argumentation to reason about
trust. Using the methodology of meta-argumentation, first we
represent the source of the information from which the argu-
ment is constructed in the abstract argumentation framework
capturing the fact that b is attacked because b is from a par-
ticular source s. We show how a source of information can
be attacked if it is not evaluated as trustworthy. Second, we
provide a fine grained representation of the trust relationships
between the information sources in which trust concerns not
only the sources but also the single arguments and attack re-
lations the sources propose. Moreover, we represent the evi-
dences in support of the arguments which are put forward by
the information sources and the agents can express arguments
by referring to other agents’ arguments. Meta-argumentation
allows us not to extend Dung’s abstract argumentation frame-
work by introducing trust and to reuse those principles and
properties defined for Dung’s framework.
Introduction
Trust is a mechanism for managing uncertain information,
decision making and dealing with the provenance of infor-
mation. The result is that trust plays an important role in
many research areas of computer science, particularly in the
semantic web and multiagent systems where agents interact
with other sources. In such interactions, the agents have to
reason if they should trust or not the other agents and the
extent to which they trust those other agents. The following
illustrative example presents an informal argument exchange
where several kinds of interactions between arguments and
agents are reflected.
• Witness1: I suspect the guy killed his boss in Rome.
(arg a)
• Witness1: With a broken car he could not reach the crime
scene. (arg b)
• Witness2: Witness1 is a compulsive liar. (arg c)
• Witness3: I repaired the guy’s car at twelve of the crime
day. (arg d)
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• Witness4: I believe that Witness2 is not able to repair that
kind of car. (arg e)
• Witness5: The guy has another car. (arg f)
• Witness6: The guy parked two cars in my underground
parking garage three weeks ago. (arg g)
• Witness2: Witness6 was on holidays three weeks ago.
(arg h)
• Witness7: The guy told he killed the boss. (arg i)
• Witness3: The guy charges himself to cover up for his
wife. (arg l)
In this informal argument exchange, different kinds of re-
lations can be highlighted between arguments and agents.
First, we have that the agents put forward the arguments
and the attack relations. We will refer to these assertions
by saying that the agents support their arguments and attack
relations. Second, the agents can attack the trustworthiness
of the other agents. These attacks are always addressed by
means of arguments which attack the agent’s trustworthiness
itself or the trustworthiness of arguments and attack relations
supported by this agent. Third, the agents can provide sup-
port to the other agents’ arguments by putting forward evi-
dences, always under the form of arguments, or by providing
arguments which talk about other agents’ arguments.
In this paper we argue that argumentation provides a
mechanism to reason about trust handling aspects such as
the origin of trust and the fine grained trust relationships.
The research question addressed in the paper is:
• How to model trust in Dung’s argumentation?
This breaks down into the following subquestions:
1. How to represent the information sources and the argu-
ments they support?
2. How to represent an attack to the trustworthiness of the
sources of information and a fine grained view of trust
relations where trust concerns also single arguments and
attacks?
3. How to represent the evidences provided in support of the
arguments?
4. How to model trust when the agents express arguments
concerning other agents’ arguments?
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Figure 1: The patterns involving agents and arguments and the trust relationships.
To answer the research questions we propose the method-
ology of meta-argumentation (Boella, van der Torre, and
Villata 2009; Boella et al. 2009). The advantage in using
meta-argumentation is that we do not extend Dung’s frame-
work (Dung 1995) in order to introduce trust but we instanti-
ate Dung’s theory with meta-arguments. In this way we can
reuse all the principles, algorithms and properties already
defined for Dung’s framework. In meta-argumentation, dif-
ferent entities besides proper arguments are introduced in
the meta-level under the form of meta-arguments and the
acceptable, trusted, meta-arguments are returned. These
meta-arguments represent the arguments of the agents and
their attack relations. The agents, as sources of arguments
and attack relations, are introduced under the form of meta-
arguments “agent i is trustable”.
The research questions ask for patterns where both agents
and arguments are composed together and are related to each
other by trust relationships. The patterns which emerge from
the informal argument exchange are provided in Figure 1
where the arrows represent the attack relation and the dou-
ble arrows represent the support relation of the agents to the
arguments they built. In Figure 1.a, the representation of the
information sources and the arguments they support is pro-
vided. Witness5 supports both arguments a, b and the attack
relation between them. In Figure 1.b, the evidence provided
by Witness6 in support to the argument of Witness5 is rep-
resented. Figure 1.c depicts the attack of Witness2 to the
trustworthiness of Witness1. Note that, this agent becomes
no more credible in the multiagent system because her cred-
ibility has been attacked as a whole. This is not always the
case, it may be possible that the agents attack other agents’
trustworthiness only concerning a particular argument or at-
tack relation. This is described in Figure 1.d-e where Wit-
ness4 and Witness2 attack the trustworthiness of Witness3
and Witness6 respectively only concerning argument g and
the attack relation d → b. Finally, arguments about other
agents’ arguments are represented in Figure 1.f where Wit-
ness7 supports by means of his argument i Witness1’s argu-
ment a.
The paper follows the research questions. After a brief in-
troduction on the methodology of meta-argumentation, we
describe how to represent the agents in an argumentation
framework and we discuss how to model the patterns defined
in Figure 1. Related work and conclusions end the paper.
Meta-Argumentation
Dung’s theory (Dung 1995) is based on a binary attack re-
lation among arguments, which are abstract entities whose
role is determined only by their relation to other arguments.
We restrict ourselves to finite argumentation frameworks,
i.e., in which the set of arguments is finite.
Definition 1 (Argumentation framework AF) An argu-
mentation framework is a tuple 〈A,→〉 where A is a finite
set of elements called arguments and→ is a binary relation
called attack defined on A×A.
A semantics of an argumentation framework consists of
a conflict-free set of arguments, i.e., a set of arguments that
does not contain an argument attacking another argument in
the set.
Definition 2 (Conflict-free) Given an argumentation
framework AF = 〈A,→〉, a set S ⊆ A is conflict free,
denoted as cf(S), iff @α, β ∈ S such that α→ β.
Like (Baroni and Giacomin 2007) we use a function E
mapping an argumentation framework 〈A,→〉 to its set of
extensions, i.e., to a set of sets of arguments. Since Baroni
and Giacomin do not give a name to the function E , and it
maps argumentation frameworks to the set of accepted argu-
ments, we call E the acceptance function.
Definition 3 Let U be the universe of arguments. An ac-
ceptance function E : 2U × 2U×U → 22U is a partial
function which is defined for each argumentation framework
〈A,→〉 with finite A ⊆ U and →⊆ A × A, and maps an
argumentation framework 〈A,→〉 to sets of subsets of A:
E(〈A,→〉) ⊆ 2A.
The following definition summarizes the most widely
used acceptability semantics of arguments given in the lit-
erature. Which semantics is most appropriate in which cir-
cumstances depends on the application domain of the argu-
mentation theory.
Definition 4 (Acceptability semantics) Let AF = 〈A,→〉
be an argumentation framework. Let S ⊆ A. S defends a
if ∀b ∈ A such that b → a, ∃c ∈ S such that c → b. Let
D(S) = {a | S defends a}.
• S ∈ Eadmiss(AF ) iff cf(S) and S ⊆ D(S).
• S ∈ Ecompl(AF ) iff cf(S) and S = D(S).
• S ∈ Eground(AF ) iff S is smallest in Ecompl(AF ).
• S ∈ Epref(AF ) iff S is maximal in Eadmiss(AF ).
• S ∈ E skep-pref(AF ) iff S = ∩Epref(AF ).
• S ∈ Estable(AF ) iff cf(S) and ∀b ∈ A\S∃a ∈ S : a→ b.
We (Boella et al. 2009) instantiate Dung’s theory with
meta-arguments, such that we use Dung’s theory to reason
about itself. Meta-argumentation is a particular way to de-
fine mappings from argumentation frameworks to extended
argumentation frameworks: arguments are interpreted as
meta-arguments, of which some are mapped to “argument a
is accepted”, acc(a), where a is an abstract argument from
the extended argumentation framework EAF . The meta-
argumentation methodology is summarized in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The meta-argumentation methodology.
The function f assigns to each argument a in the
EAF , a meta-argument “argument a is accepted” in
the basic argumentation framework. We use Dung’s
acceptance functions E to find functions E ′ between
extended argumentation frameworks EAF and the ac-
ceptable arguments AA′ they return. The accepted
arguments of the meta-argumentation framework are
a function of the extended argumentation framework
AA = E ′(EAF ). The transformation function consists
of two parts: a function f−1 transforms an argumentation
framework AF to an extended argumentation framework
EAF , and a function g transforms the acceptable argu-
ments of the AF into acceptable arguments of the EAF .
Summarizing E ′ = {(f−1(a), g(b)) | (a, b) ∈ E} and
AA′ = E ′(EAF ) = g(AA) = g(E(AF )) = g(E(f(EAF ))).
The first step of our approach is to define the set of ex-
tended argumentation frameworks. The second step consists
in defining flattening algorithms as a function from this set
of EAF s to the set of all basic argumentation frameworks:
f : EAF → AF .
Definition 5 presents the instantiation of a basic argu-
mentation framework as a sequence of partial argumenta-
tion frameworks of the agents (Coste-Marquis et al. 2007)
using meta-argumentation. A sequence of partial argumen-
tation frameworks of the agents 〈〈A1,→1〉, . . . , 〈An,→n〉〉
are sets composed by arguments Ai and a binary attack re-
lation→i.
The universe of meta-arguments is MU = {acc(a) | a ∈
U} ∪ {Xa,b, Ya,b | a, b ∈ U}, and the flattening function f
is given by f(EAF ) = 〈MA, 7−→〉. For a set of arguments
B ⊆ MU , the unflattening function g is given by g(B) =
{a | acc(a) ∈ B}, and for sets of arguments AA ⊆ 2MU , it
is given by g(AA) = {g(B) | B ∈ AA}.
Definition 5 Given an extended argumentation framework
EAF = 〈〈A1,→1〉, . . . , 〈An,→n〉〉 where for each agent
1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ai ⊆ U is a set of arguments and →i⊆
Ai × Ai is a binary relation over Ai, the set of meta-
arguments MA ⊆ MU is {acc(a) | a ∈ A1 ∪ . . . ∪ An}
and 7−→⊆ MA × MA is a binary relation on MA such
that: acc(a) 7−→ Xa,b, Xa,b 7−→ Ya,b, Ya,b 7−→ acc(b) if
and only if there is an agent 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that a, b ∈ Ai
and a→i b.
The set of acceptable arguments of a meta-
argumentation framework 〈MA, 7−→〉 follows from
E ′(EAF ) = g(E(f(EAF ))). For a given flattening
function f , the acceptance function of the extended argu-
mentation theory E ′ is defined using the acceptance function
of the basic abstract argumentation theory E : an argument
of an EAF is acceptable iff it is acceptable in the flattened
AF .
Modelling trust in Dung’s framework
A number of authors have highlighted that the definition of
trust is difficult to pin down precisely, thus in the litera-
ture there are numerous different definitions. To pick few
of these definitions, (Castelfranchi and Falcone 2001) define
trust as “a mental state, a complex attitude of an agent x
towards another agent y about the behaviour/action a rele-
vant for the goal g” while (Gambetta 1990) states that “trust
is the subjective probability by which an individual A ex-
pects that another individual B performs a given action on
which its welfare depends”. The common elements are that
there is a consistent degree of uncertainty associated with
trust and trust is tied up with the relationships between indi-
viduals and particularly it is related to the actions of the in-
dividuals and to the effects these actions have on the others.
Another approach to model trust using modal logic is pro-
posed by (Lorini and Demolombe 2008) where they present
a concept of trust that integrates the trusters goal, the trustees
action ensuring the achievement of the trusters goal, and the
trustees ability and intention to do this action. In this pa-
per we does not refer to the actions of the agents and their
goals but we provide a model for representing the agents’
beliefs concerning the trustworthiness of the other agents.
We follow the approach proposed by (Liau 2003) where the
influence of trust on the assimilation of acquired information
into an agent’s belief is considered. (Liau 2003)’s character-
istic axiom is “if agent i believes that agent j has told him
the truth of p and he trusts the judgement of j on p, then he
will also believe p”.
Representing the information sources
Let us consider again the informal argument exchange. We
have that Witness2 has a negative opinion about the trust-
worthiness of Witness1 while we can infer that all the other
witnesses consider Witness1 a reliable information source
since they do not attack him. Agents are introduced in
the meta-argumentation framework under the form of meta-
arguments “agent i is trustable”, trust(i), for all the agents
i. As in Definition 5, we add meta-arguments “argument
a is accepted”, acc(a), for all arguments in A, and meta-
arguments Xa,b, Ya,b for all arguments a and b such that
a → b. Each argument a ∈ A in the mind of the agents is
put forward, by means of the Zacc(a) meta-argument. This
meta-argument attacks the meta-argument acc(a) asking for
an evidence in support of argument a. In the simplest case,
the Zacc(a) meta-argument is attacked by the meta-argument
trust(i) which represents the agent who proposes argument
a, as shown in Figure 3. More complex cases of evidences
are described in the next sections. For each agent i, if →i
contains a → b, such as if the agent puts forward an attack
relation, then the meta-argument trust(i) supports the meta-
argument Ya,b, representing the attack relation, by attacking
the meta-argumentZYa,b , as concerning the arguments. Also
in this case, the attack of the agent to the Z meta-argument
is an evidence in support of this attack relation.
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Figure 3: Introducing the agents in the framework.
We represent the fact that more than one information
source sustains the same arguments by let them attacking
by means of the trust(i) meta-arguments the same Zacc(a)
meta-argument which asks for evidences in support of meta-
argument acc(a). An example of multiple support of two
agents regarding the same argument is depicted in Figure 4.
The same solution is applied to the attack relations where we
consider the meta-argument Ya,b instead of meta-argument
acc(a).
acc(a)
trust(1)
Z(acc(a))
trust(2)Agent2Agent1
a flattening
Figure 4: A multiple support to the same argument.
We extend the EAF proposed in Definition 5 by adding
the information sources and second-order attacks, such as
attacks from an argument or attack relation to another at-
tack relation. For more details about second-order attacks in
meta-argumentation, see (Boella et al. 2009).
The unflattening function g and the acceptance function
E ′ are defined as above. In particular, the introduction of the
agents in the meta-argumentation framework is defined as
follows:
Definition 6 An extended argumentation framework EAF
is a tuple 〈〈A1,→1,→21〉 . . . , 〈An,→n,→2n〉〉 where for
each agent 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ai ⊆ U is a set of arguments, →i
is a binary relation on Ai × Ai,→2i is a binary relation on
(Ai∪ →i)× →i.
Definition 7 Given an extended argumentation framework
EAF = 〈〈A1,→1,→21〉 . . . , 〈An,→n,→2n〉〉, the set of
meta-arguments MA is {trust(i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {acc(a) |
a ∈ A1 ∪ . . .∪An}∪ {Xa,b, Ya,b | a, b ∈ A1 ∪ . . .∪An}∪
{Za | a ∈ A1∪ . . .∪An} and 7−→⊆MA×MA is a binary
relation on MA such that:
• acc(a) 7−→ Xa,b, Xa,b 7−→ Ya,b, Ya,b 7−→ acc(b) iff
a, b ∈ Ai and a→i b, and
• trust(i) 7−→ Zacc(a), Zacc(a) 7−→ acc(a) iff a ∈ Ai, and
• trust(i) 7−→ ZYa,b , ZYa,b 7−→ Ya,b iff a, b ∈ Ai and
a→i b, and
• acc(a) 7−→ Xa,b→c, Xa,b→c 7−→ Ya,b→c, Ya,b→c 7−→
Yb,c iff a, b, c ∈ Ai and a→2i (b→i c),
• Ya,b 7−→ Yc,d iff a, b, c ∈ Ai and (a→i b)→2i (c→i d).
Example 1 We represent the agents in the argumentation
framework as shown in Figure 3. Witness1 puts forward two
arguments a and b and the attack relation between them.
Using the flattening function described in Definition 7, we
add the meta-argument trust(1) for representing Witness1
in the framework and we add meta-arguments acc(a) and
acc(b) for the arguments of Witness1. The attack relation is
represented by means of two meta-arguments Xa,b and Ya,b
which stay for the inactive and active status of the attack
relation a → b. Witness1 provides an evidence in support
to the arguments a and b and the attack relation a → b by
attacking the respective meta-arguments Z.
Representing fine grained trust relationships
In our model, trust is represented as the absence of an attack
towards the agents or towards their arguments and attack re-
lations or as the presence of an evidence in support of argu-
ments and attack relations. On the contrary, the lack of trust,
here called distrust, is modeled as a lack of evidences in sup-
port of the arguments and the attack relations or as an attack
relation towards the agents and their arguments and attack
relations. The three distrust relationships depicted in Fig-
ure 1.c-d-e are of different kind and must be distinguished in
the framework in order to reason about trust. Notice that the
notion of distrust can be associated to a different meaning
from lack of trust or insufficient trust such as diffidence to-
wards a source s. In this case, the argumentation is precisely
aimed at creating distrust. Modeling this kind of distrust is
left for future work.
In the informal argument exchange, Witness2 attacks the
trustworthiness of Witness1 as a credible witness. In this
way, he is attacking each argument and attack relation pro-
posed by Witness1. Witness4, instead, is not arguing against
Witness3 but he is arguing against the attack relation d→ b
as proposed by Witness3. Finally, Witness2 reasons about
the trustworthiness of Witness6. The untrustworthiness of
Witness6 is linked only to the precise argument g. Our pro-
posal is a fine grained view of trust in which the sources of
information may be attacked for being unreliable or for be-
ing unreliable in sustaining a particular argument or attack
relation. Definition 8 presents an extended argumentation
framework in which a new relation between arguments is
given to represent distrust.
Definition 8 A trust-based extended argumentation frame-
work TEAF is a tuple 〈〈A1,→1, DT1〉, . . . , 〈An,→n
, DTn〉〉 where for each agent 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ai ⊆ U is a
set of arguments, →i⊆ Ai × Ai is a binary relation and
DT ⊆ Ai × ϑ is a binary relation such that ϑ ∈ j or ϑ ∈
Aj or ϑ ∈→j .
The extended argumentation framework TEAF would
need new semantics in order to compute what are the
accepted arguments. In alternative, we use the meta-
argumentation methodology to flatten the TEAF to a meta-
argumentation framework where classical Dung’s semantics
are used to compute the set of acceptable arguments. We
define the meta-argumentation framework in the following
way where the unflattening function g and the acceptance
function E ′ are defined as above.
Definition 9 Given a trust-based extended argu-
mentation framework TEAF = 〈〈A1,→1, DT1〉,
. . . , 〈An,→n, DTn〉〉, see Definition 8, the set of meta-
arguments MA is {trust(i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {acc(a) | a ∈
A1∪ . . .∪An}∪{Xa,b, Ya,b | a, b ∈ A1∪ . . .∪An}∪{Za |
a ∈ A1 ∪ . . . ∪ An} and 7−→⊆ MA × MA is a binary
relation on MA such that:
• acc(a) 7−→ Xa,b, Xa,b 7−→ Ya,b, Ya,b 7−→ accept(b) iff a, b ∈
Ai and a→i b, and
• trust(i) 7−→ Xtrust(i),Zacc(a) , Xtrust(i),Zacc(a) 7−→
Ytrust(i),Zacc(a) , Ytrust(i),Zacc(a) 7−→ Zacc(a), Zacc(a) 7−→
acc(a) iff a ∈ Ai, and
• trust(i) 7−→ Xtrust(i),ZYa,b , Xtrust(i),ZYa,b 7−→
Ytrust(i),ZYa,b , Ytrust(i),ZYa,b 7−→ ZYa,b , ZYa,b 7−→ Ya,b iff
a, b ∈ Ai and a→i b, and
• trust(i) 7−→ Zacc(a), Zacc(a) 7−→
acc(a), acc(a) 7−→ Xacc(a),trust(j), Xacc(a),trust(j) 7−→
Yacc(a),trust(j), Yacc(a),trust(j) 7−→ trust(j) iff a ∈ Ai and
aDTitrust(j), and
• trust(i) 7−→ Zacc(a), Zacc(a) 7−→ acc(a), acc(a) 7−→
Xacc(a),Ytrust(j),Zacc(b)
, Xacc(a),Ytrust(j),Zacc(b)
7−→
Yacc(a),Ytrust(j),Zacc(b)
, Yacc(a),Ytrust(j),Zacc(b)
7−→
Ytrust(j),Zacc(b) iff a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Aj and aDTib, and
• trust(i) 7−→ Zacc(a), Zacc(a) 7−→ acc(a), acc(a) 7−→
Xacc(a),Ytrust(j),ZYb,c
, Xacc(a),Ytrust(j),ZYb,c
7−→
Yacc(a),Ytrust(j),ZYb,c
, Yacc(a),Ytrust(j),ZYb,c
7−→
Ytrust(j),ZYb,c iff a ∈ Ai, b, c ∈ Aj and aDTi(b→j c).
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Figure 5: Fine grained trust in argumentation.
Definition 9 shows how to instantiate an extended argu-
mentation framework composed by a set of arguments, a bi-
nary attack relation and a binary distrust relation with meta-
arguments. In particular, the last three points model respec-
tively a distrust relationship towards an agent, towards an
argument and towards an attack relation.
Example 2 In Figure 5 we highlight the three patterns
where trust relations between information sources are
represented. The first pattern shows that Witness2 attacks
the trustworthiness of Witness1 with the argument c. In
meta-argumentation, we have that trust(2) proposes
acc(c) by attacking meta-argument Zacc(c) and, with
meta-arguments X,Y , it attacks trust(1). This means that
if Witness1 is not reliable then each of his arguments and
attack relations cannot be acceptable either. If we look at
the extension of this pattern, we have that the set of ac-
ceptable arguments for the meta-argumentation framework
is E(f(pattern1)) = {trust(2), acc(c), Yacc(c),trust(1)}.
Consider the other two patterns of Figure 5. On the one
hand, Witness4 attacks the attack relation d → b proposed
by Witness3. This is achieved in meta-argumentation by an
attack from meta-argument acc(e), proposed by trust(4),
to the attack relation characterized by meta-argument
Yd,b. The set of acceptable arguments is E(f(pattern2)) =
{trust(4), trust(3), acc(d), acc(e), acc(b), Yacc(e),Ytrust(3),ZYb,d ,
ZYd,b}. Witness3’s attack relation d → b is evaluated as
not reliable for Witness4 and it is not acceptable. On
the other hand, Witness2 evaluates unreliable Wit-
ness6 concerning argument g. In meta-argumentation,
trust(2), by means of meta-argument acc(h), attacks
meta-argument acc(g) proposed by trust(6). In this
case, the set of acceptable arguments is E(f(pattern3)) =
{trust(2), trust(6), acc(h), Yacc(h),Ytrust(6),Zacc(g) , Zacc(g)}.
Representing the evidences supporting arguments
The evidences in favor of the arguments are represented, as
discussed before, as a support given by the agents to the ar-
guments at the object level. At the meta-level, this is mod-
eled as an attack relation from meta-argument trust(i) to
the Z meta-arguments. However, there are also cases in
which evidences are necessary to support the acceptability
of an argument. Let consider the case in which the trust-
worthiness of an agent is attacked. What does it happen to
the arguments put forward by this agent? They become not
acceptable. In this case, what is needed to reinstate the ac-
ceptability of these arguments is an evidence. This evidence
is provided under the form of an argument put forward by
another agent.
Definition 7 presents how to instantiate an extended ar-
gumentation framework composed by a set of arguments,
a binary attack relation, a binary second-order attack rela-
tion representing also the information sources. Definition 9,
instead, extends Dung’s framework with a distrust relation
DT . In order to have an extended argumentation framework
with both the relations of the EAF of Definition 7 and the
TEAF of Definition 9, we define an extended trust-based
argumentation framework with the addition of an evidence
relation# which represents the evidences provided in favor
of the arguments of the other agents.
Definition 10 A trust-based argumentation frame-
work with evidences TEAF 2 = 〈〈A1,→1,→21,#1
, T1〉, . . . , 〈An,→n,→2n,#n, Tn〉〉, see Definition 7 and
Definition 9, where #i is a binary relation on Ai × Aj
and the set of meta-arguments MA is {trust(i) | 1 ≤
i ≤ n} ∪ {acc(a) | a ∈ A1 ∪ . . . ∪ An} ∪ {Xa,b, Ya,b |
a, b ∈ A1 ∪ . . . ∪ An} ∪ {Za | a ∈ A1 ∪ . . . ∪ An} and
7−→⊆MA×MA is a binary relation on MA such that the
conditions of Definition 7 and Definition 9 hold, and:
• acc(a) 7−→ Zacc(b), Zacc(b) 7−→ acc(b) iff a, b ∈ Ai and
a#i b.
Example 3 We have that argument f is “The guy has an-
other car” while argument g by Witness6 is “ The guy
parked two cars in my underground parking garage three
weeks ago”. Argument g is an evidence in favor of f . This
evidence is expressed in meta-argumentation as an attack
from meta-argument acc(g) to meta-argument Zacc(f) at-
tacking acc(f). This example is described in Figure 6.
Representing arguments about other agents’
arguments
The information sources may also express arguments con-
cerning other agents’ arguments as in the case of arguments
i and a during the informal argument exchange. In this case
we have that Witness7 proposes an argument which is based
on the argument of another agent, Witness1. Moreover, we
have that Witness3 introduces argument l which attacks the
F
Witness5
G
Witness6
flattening
trust(5)
acc(g)
trust(6)
acc(f)
Z(acc(f))Z(acc(g))
Figure 6: Introducing evidences in favor of the arguments.
support of argument i to argument a. If we add to the ex-
tended trust-based argumentation framework TEAF 2 a new
binary relation 99K⊆ Ai × Ai, we can model the report of
other agents’ arguments in the following way:
Definition 11 Given an extended trust-based argu-
mentation framework TEAF 2 = 〈〈A1,→1,→21,#1
, T1, 99K1 〉, . . . , 〈An,→n,→2n,#n, Tn, 99Kn〉〉, the set of
meta-arguments MA is {trust(i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {acc(a) |
a ∈ A1 ∪ . . .∪An}∪ {Xa,b, Ya,b | a, b ∈ A1 ∪ . . .∪An}∪
{Za | a ∈ A1∪ . . .∪An}∪{dixita,b | a, b ∈ A1∪ . . .∪An}
and 7−→⊆MA×MA is a binary relation onMA such that
the conditions of Definition 7, Definition 9 and Definition 10
hold and:
• acc(a) 7−→ Zdixita,b , Zdixita,b 7−→
dixita,b, dixita,b 7−→ Zacc(b), Zacc(b) 7−→ acc(b)
iff a, b ∈ Ai and a 99Ki b and
• acc(a) 7−→ Xacc(a),dixitb,c , Xacc(a),dixitb,c 7−→
Yacc(a),dixitb,c , Yacc(a),dixitb,c 7−→ dixit(b, c) iff
a ∈ Ai, b, c ∈ Aj and aDTi(b 99Ki c).
A
I Witness1
Witness7
flattening
acc(a)
trust(1) trust(3)
Z(acc(a)) trust(7)
Z(acc(i))dixit(i,a)
Z(acc(l))
acc(l)
X(acc(l),dixit(i,a))
Y(acc(l),dixit(i,a)) acc(i)
Z(dixit(i,a))
Figure 7: Introducing arguments about other agents’ argu-
ments.
Example 4 Let TEAF 2 be defined as A1 = {a, b}, →1=
{(b, a)}, A2 = {c, h}, DT2 = {(c, 1), (h, g)}, A3 =
{b, d, l}, →3= {(d, b)}, DT3 = {(l, 99K7 (i, a))}, A4 =
{e}, DT4 = {(e,→3 (d, b))}, A5 = {a, b, f}, →25=
{(f, (b, a))}, A6 = {a, g}, #6= {(g, f)}, A7 = {i},
99K7= {(i, a)}. This extended argumentation framework
is the model of the informal argument exchange proposed in
the introduction. In Figure 7, we introduce arguments i and
l under the form of meta-arguments. We have that argument
i reports an argument from the guy which sustains argument
a proposed by trust(1). trust(7) proposes meta-argument
acc(i) and a dixit relation 99K7= {(i, a)} holds between ar-
guments i and a. This is represented in meta-argumentation
by the new meta-argument dixiti,a which is sustained, by
means of meta-argument Zdixiti,a , by acc(i). Witness3 does
not agree about the link between arguments i and a because
in his opinion the guy admitted to kill the boss only to pro-
tect his wife (argument l). This attack has the aim to elimi-
nate the support which argument i gives to argument a. We
represent it in meta-argumentation by adding an attack re-
lation from meta-argument acc(l) claimed by trust(3) to
meta-argument dixiti,a. In this way the attack of dixit(i, a)
to Zacc(a) is made ineffective and meta-argument acc(a)
would be acceptable only if sustained by some other meta-
argument. The set of acceptable arguments of the TEAF 2 is
E ′(TEAF 2) = g(E(f(TEAF 2))) = {b, c, d, e, f, h, i, l}
and the trustable information sources are all the witnesses
except Witness1 who has been directly attacked by Witness2.
Related work
(Dix et al. 2009) present trust as a major issue in MAS ap-
plications concerning the research challenges for argumen-
tation. Which agents are trustworthy? This is important for
taking decisions and weighing arguments of other agents.
(Parsons, McBurney, and Sklar 2010) discuss why argu-
mentation has an important role to play in reasoning about
trust and highlight what are the mechanisms which need to
be investigated through argumentation. The authors claim
that a first problem, particularly of abstract approaches such
that of (Dung 1995), is that they cannot express the prove-
nance of trust and they cannot express the fact that b is at-
tacked because b is proposed by agent s and there is an ev-
idence that s is not trustworthy. In this paper, we propose a
methodology which allows us to instantiate Dung’s frame-
work with meta-arguments which represent the information
sources. Moreover, we show how to express trust relation-
ships between the sources. Another problem highlighted
by (Parsons, McBurney, and Sklar 2010) is the explicit ex-
pression of degrees of trust, as adopted by the prevalence of
numerical measures of trust in the literature. In this paper,
we do not present an explicit expression of degrees of trust
and this is a topic for further research but we present a model
where a fine grained view of trust relationships is provided.
(Matt, Morge, and Toni 2010) propose an extension to
the Dempster-Shafer belief function. The authors allow the
evaluator agent to take into account, in addition to the statis-
tical data, a set of justified claims concerning the expected
behaviour of the target agent. These claims form the basis of
the evaluator’s opinions and are formally represented by ar-
guments in abstract argumentation. Two kinds of arguments
are defined: forecast arguments and mitigation arguments.
Forecast arguments express the trustworthiness or untrust-
worthiness of the target agent and mitigation arguments at-
tack forecast arguments or other mitigation arguments be-
cause of the uncertainties of the validity of forecast argu-
ments. Dempster-Shafer belief function is constructed both
from statistical data and from these arguments. Arguments
are generated by contracts. We propose an approach to the
introduction of trust which is more related to modelling and
no statistical problems are addressed. We show how to intro-
duce the provenance of the information in the argumentation
framework. (Matt, Morge, and Toni 2010) have focused on
the computation of trust by an evaluator of a target in isola-
tion. We propose a model in which all the trust relationships
are evaluated together and we do not restrict our model to
the contracts.
(Stranders, de Weerdt, and Witteveen 2007) propose an
approach to trust based on argumentation in which there is
a separation between the opponent modeling and decision
making. The opponents’ behaviour is modeled using possi-
bilistic logic. The paper shows the results based on the ART
testbed. In our approach we use Dung’s abstract framework
and we do not present a decision making approach to trust.
We are interested in modeling fine grained trust in argumen-
tation and we do not present experimental results.
(Prade 2007) presents a bipolar qualitative argumentative
modeling of trust where a finite number of levels is assumed
in a trust scale and trust and distrust are assessed indepen-
dently. The author introduces the notion of reputation which
is viewed as an input information used by an agent for re-
vising or updating his trust evaluation. Reputation con-
tributes also to provide direct arguments in favour or against
a trust evaluation. There are a number of differences be-
tween (Prade 2007) and our approach. First, we does not
apply a diagnostic point of view as in (Prade 2007) but we
are interested in a social multiagent perspective. Second,
we use a Dung’s based approach while in (Prade 2007) ar-
guments have an abductive form. Graded trust is presented
also by (Lorini and Demolombe 2008) where they move be-
yond binary trust (i.e. either agent i trusts agent j or i does
not trust j) in order to capture a concept of graded trust.
An approach related to trust in argumentation is provided
by (Hunter 2008) where the author introduces a logic-based
meta-level argumentation framework for evaluating argu-
ments in terms of the appropriateness of their proponents. A
further investigation of the relation between trust evaluation
and proponents’ appropriateness is an interesting direction
for future research.
Conclusions
In this paper, a way to model trust in Dung’s frame-
work is presented. We answer the research ques-
tions using the methodology of meta-argumentation where
Dung’s framework is used to reason about itself. Meta-
argumentation (Boella, van der Torre, and Villata 2009;
Boella et al. 2009) allows us to introduce the notion of trust
without extending Dung’s standard argumentation frame-
work and by reusing Dung’s semantics and properties.
We represent the sources of information in the abstract
argumentation framework in order to link the agents to the
arguments they construct. We introduce the agents as meta-
arguments of the kind “agent i is trustable”, trust(i), and
each agent is linked to the arguments he proposes by means
of meta-arguments Zx. Meta-arguments trust(i) attack
meta-arguments Zx when x is an argument or an attack re-
lation put forward by agent i. For each agent who sustains
argument/attack x, there is an attack from trust(i) to Zx.
In this way, the argumentation framework keeps track of the
provenance of the arguments and attack relations and it al-
lows us to represent evidences in the framework. More than
one agent can support the same argument. This is expressed
in meta-argumentation in the following way. If the agents
support directly an argument or attack x, then they both at-
tack meta-argument Zx. If the agents propose new argu-
ments which sustain other arguments then this is expressed
by an attack from meta-argument acc(a) to Zacc(b), where
argument a is an evidence of argument b.
The trustworthiness of the agents can be attacked by at-
tacking meta-arguments trust(i) representing the agents in
the argumentation framework. The agents, supporting argu-
ments against the trustworthiness of the other agents, attack
the reliability of the other agents. Trust is represented as
an absence of attacks on the agents’ trustworthiness. The
agents who are not evaluated as reliable in the framework are
those whose meta-argument trust(i) is not in the extension
of the meta-argumentation framework. We present a fine
grained view of trust relationships. The agents can express
their evaluation on other agents’ reliability also concerning
single arguments and attack relations proposed by the unreli-
able agents. We express the evaluation of the untrustworthi-
ness of arguments and attacks by means of attacks to the YZx
meta-argument which is used by meta-argument trust(i) to
attack meta-argument Zx.
If the arguments or attack relations evaluated unreliable
are not supported by other evidences, such as arguments
which attack the Zx meta-argument, then they are made
unacceptable in the extension of the meta-argumentation
framework.
Agents can express reported arguments about arguments
expressed by other agents. This is represented in meta-
argumentation with meta-argument dixita,b where argu-
ment a reports what is expressed by argument b. Meta-
argument acc(a) supports, by means of meta-argument
Zdixit(a,b), meta-argument dixita,b which supports acc(b).
In this way, the support of the dixit meta-argument can be
attacked by other arguments if the agents believe it to be an
unreliable information.
Future research is addressed following different lines.
First, we are studying how to express trust revision. As
highlighted also by (Parsons, McBurney, and Sklar 2010),
an important aspect in reasoning about trust is the need for a
source to be able to revise the trust she has in another source
based on experience. Second, there is a bidirectional link be-
tween the source and its input: the provided data is more or
less believable on the basis of the source trustworthiness but
there is a feedback such that the invalidation of the data feed-
backs on the sources credibility (Castelfranchi and Falcone
2001). The investigation of this relation is left for future re-
search. Third, we plan to investigate two dimensions of trust
that have to be independently evaluated such as the sincer-
ity/credibility of a source and the competence of a source.
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